If you watched City v Arsenal at the weekend, one thing was abundantly clear. City, in their typical domineering manner, controlled the game. Arsenal, attempting to pursue a similar sense of dominance, did not. Two teams trying to control possession and harness the skill and craft of their players by giving them space and opportunities is far from a new idea, but how teams are battling for that dominance may be.
Much like, say, Dan Harmon’s subversion of the hero’s journey, Jose Mourinho’s career is and has been predicted on subversion. Where teams were once reluctant to dawn a cogent structure at the turn of the millennia, the once-obscure Portuguese manager rose to prominence by pushing system over individual. In harnessing the space that could be created by negating the opposition’s attempt to create it, Mourinho was the anti. Successfully reprising this parlour trick after Guardiola’s rise to prominence spawned an entire generation of copy cats.
Now, however, after the modernization of pressing- namely, A Klopp/ Guardiola Frankenstein that doesn’t just ask for extremely physical harrying, but for an organized, coordinated limitation of space across the entire shape- Mourinho’s dichotomy is no more. Teams aren’t simply attack versus defense, at least not in traditional terms. Part of this is down to a strange, paradoxical definition of good and bad performance. Where good defending may have been traditionally defined as an excellent tackle or savvy shielding of possession, football’s pseudo-philosophers have been quoted and misquoted, speaking to ideas regarding a lack thereof. ‘If I need to make a tackle, I’ve already made a mistake,’ an ethereal font states, superimposed over a picture of a bloodied and battered Maldini or some other typically mythologized figure.
For however cliche and cringe-inducing these crystallizations of ideology may be, they do underline an important shift. The paradox of what demarcates good and bad performance has shifted within football. Whether that understanding has reached the general populous remains to be seen, but clubs have long since understood that what once brought acceptable outcomes no longer does. Sitting deep and negating space through basic organization no longer yields both defensive security and high-quality opportunities when the levy does inevitably break. Not only have a good portion of top-level sides gotten better at breaking down deep blocks, but most also train pre-emptive measures meant to slow transitions and limit exposure.
But with Football Theory ostensibly guiding much of the evolution of teams shifting away from hard nose tackling and now-limp defensive measures, the material corollary dictating that change must be examined if we’re to understand why we’re here and potentially where we’re going. To return to the original example, City v Arsenal provides a perfect showcase as to why traditional defending is no longer effective and where the future of this increasingly ambiguous concept may lie.
Many have spoken to the positional fluidity synonymous with Manchester City’s play, but few understand what it is. The novelty of a right-back popping up in midfield isn’t necessarily what creates an opportunity for another player in a forward position; it’s the role and space they’re occupying that allows for another piece of the puzzle to shift and distract the defensive formation. In simple terms, City risk a lot with their positioning but maintain the individual skill and quality to walk that tightrope and still reap the rewards. They aren’t just pushing people forward; they’re doing so in manner that maximizes the possibility of a take-on or cross being met with a shot or high-quality pass.
Part of this is done by carefully recreating situations practiced on the training ground. Even a cursory glance at the drills taking place in the background of City vlogs yields a familiar view of five players crashing the box in advantageous locations. But how they get there is equally as important. The buildup is always calculated and predicated on reaction. The ball recycling through the defensive midfielders, inverted fullbacks, and central defenders is meant to lure the defensive shell out of a more compact shape and penetrate through the ever-elusive central areas. Still, if that isn’t possible, an overload of players on one side can open up just enough room for someone inside to pick a pass after a defensive action has been triggered.
How one defends this is what modern teams have had such an issue with. Because City are so practiced in possession and can often expand the relevant space whenever things are getting a bit too hairy, it’s hard to both win the ball and catch them on the counter. Liverpool are the pioneers of baiting certain passes they understood to be advantageous for City’s progression, but it’s something much easier said than done. Especially since it’s one of the only measures that’s been successful against City over the past few years. They’re both more aware of it and better prepared for when it goes wrong.
From a traditional perspective, defending against a team like City is so hard because they’re a perfect encapsulation of how the game has changed focal points. In the good old days, a player dribbling, making their way past a player or two would be an obvious threat. The requisite action would be obvious, and it was largely a matter of physicality that dictated the outcome. In today’s game, that couldn’t be further from the truth. The danger is always happening because it derives itself from manipulating space off the ball while simultaneously requiring attention from the player with possession. Take a look at most goals where the final line is caught floundering. The press on the ball wasn’t tight enough, but that action coordinated with a run stemming from the action.
While plenty of teams are able to execute something like this, City’s reaches a new level. Their movement of possession across the backline is so practiced, the players know exactly what they’re looking for, and the players at the front are moving in a manner that makes it nearly impossible to track. So, to return to the original question of how one might defend against it, we reach a theoretical end. As previously stated, Liverpool’s demolition of City may be one of the only true triumphs over City as far as legitimate repeatable performance goes, but with City wary to the kinds of pressing traps teams are likely to use, the Reds have had a tough time repeating that near-impossible feat.
Aside from that, it’s hard to see what more defenses might conjure up to stop them. Stopping the play at the source inevitably gives way to the difficulty of giving City’s front five ample backspace to play into, and sitting deep is just a training exercise at this point. You risk far more by not being able to press like Liverpool because of spatial gambles needed to push onto City, and they’re just more likely to play through you. Mikel Arteta, in his infinite wisdom, chose to try and battle for dominance of possession. He was categorically overwhelmed, and thus a rather dour performance came as a result, but given Arsenal’s defensive woes and their inconsistency in coordinated pressing- it wasn’t the worst idea.
Where there was once a material corollary for players to recognize and react to, now there is a disappearing material corollary for teams to react to as far as defending goes. Which isn’t to say it’s impossible to perceive how City are attacking, but if you must limit the space, pressure, stay on the half turn to avoid exposure, win individual battles, track runs, and bait passes- it’s hard to see how more than two teams are going to be able to do that.
Of course, much of this impossibility of being, of gives without takes, can be said to encapsulate the state of the modern game. It’s hard to see how teams could get much better than current City because they’re created from circumstances that are, particularly in a covid reality, untenable. As much as fans loathe to examine it, how we’ve arrived at the current materialization of ‘the greatest league in the world’ may have finally affirmed the predicate, albeit at a horrifying price.
Tangents on the state of the world aside, the game's current performance is difficult to see past. Adopting a back six may be more common than certain [REDACTED] journalists imagine it to be, but it’s hardly more than a desperate move for solidity. Whether we’ll see another era of defensive prowess remains to be seen, so I ask you, the reader, to give me your take.
Are we at football’s endgame? Or am I simply failing the imagine a world outside this one? Comment below.